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ABSTRACT
After the Great Recession, there has been speculation as to whether it is possible to
effectively detect systemic risk in the financial sector in order to guide macroprudential policy.
This paper explores how aggregate indicators may be significant in forecasting banking crises
among and across advanced economies. The paper begins by reviewing financial crisis theory
and noteworthy qualitative frameworks and quantitative models for predicting financial crises.
Mindful of the literature and models, machine learning techniques are used to assess the
significance of 26 indicators in forecasting crises, two years in advance, for 20 high income
countries. The classification models per country indicate that domestic credit to the private
sector, as a percent of GDP, is the most common significant indicator in forecasting banking
crises. When creating classification models inclusive of all countries, which are assumed to be of
comparable financial depth, the bank lending-deposit spread becomes the most significant
indicator. While the specificity of the models per country were quite high, the specificity
dropped dramatically for models across countries. Overall, the results indicate a significant
relationship between indicators of financial depth and banking crises, however, more data is
needed to build upon these models to ensure their robustness.
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INTRODUCTION
Eight years after its onset, the impacts of the Global Financial Crisis persist. The United
States economy and others still suffer from below pre-crisis rates of growth, due to the credit
boom gone “bad.” The fear of deflationary spirals fueled extensive quantitative easing measures,
both domestically and abroad. In addition to enormous bailouts, the Federal Reserve is keeping
interest rates low,1 despite signs of robust recovery.2
In light of the ramifications of the crisis, there is pressure for the Federal Reserve, and
similar institutions abroad, to go beyond measures of recovery and to implement policies which
serve to detect and avoid similar crises in the future. However there exists widespread skepticism
as to whether it is possible to effectively mitigate such crises.3 This skepticism stems from the
belief that policies aimed at reducing systemic risk would also hamper positive growth,
essentially over-pricing risk,4 because of their inability to differentiate a “good” credit boom
from one that will likely end in a bust. In other words, such policy would treat every credit boom
as though it would result in crisis even if the credit boom was actually tied to a positive change
in market fundamentals. Moreover, a recent study by the IMF showed that only one in three
credit booms end in financial crisis,5 which may provide reason to question widespread, stringent
regulation. However, in theory, if there was an ability to differentiate the good from the bad, then

1

See Appendix Figure 1.1 U.S. Federal Funds Rate, 2006-2015
See Appendix Figures 1.2 & 1.3 on U.S. Unemployment and Real GDP Growth for signs of robust recovery post
crisis
3
On October 5th, 2015, the New York Times published an article “Policy makers skeptical on preventing financial
crisis” covering Federal Reserve Conference in which these doubts were expressed over the ability to detect
financial crises
4
See Appendix Figure 1.4 Financial Sector Vulnerability to Shocks and Pricing of Risk comparing the pricing of
risk in periods of higher regulation versus lesser regulation
5
IMF study “Policies for macrofinancial stability: How to deal with credit boom” based definition of credit boom on
above trend credit growth!
2
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there could be appropriate intervention through the use of macroprudential policy, which
encompasses a set of tools to avoid periods of financial instability.
This paper sets to explore indicators that may be helpful in predicting banking crises
amongst advanced economies. First, the paper will present a brief background on financial crisis
theory. Next, noteworthy qualitative and quantitative models for predicting financial crises will
be discussed. Mindful of these models, machine learning techniques are used to explore how
indicators from the Global Financial Development Database, concerning financial depth,
efficiency, stability and other general economic indicators, may be useful in forecasting banking
crises. Lastly, the paper discusses how these results may have implications for the tailoring and
execution of macroprudential policy.
FINANCIAL CRISES BACKGROUND
Development of Financial Crisis Theory
Theories that financial instability could arise from built-up imbalances within the
financial system have not always been widely accepted, despite their long histories. References
to such phenomena date back to Adam Smith’s use of “over-trading” to explain financial crises.
More specifically, he described “a general error committed by large and small traders when the
profits from trade happen to be greater than normal.” (Adam Smith 1776, 406) Smith’s theory is
then corroborated by other economists over time, such as Mathew Carey and John Stuart Mill,
that note that “the credit cycle breeds optimism which in turn breeds recklessness and leads to a
crises and stagnation.” (Mullineux 1990, 64) It is important to note that this set of theories
suggest booms start by a true positive change in market fundamentals, such as increased demand,
but then irrational exuberance, endogenous to the system, propagates the cycle and then leads to
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the extension of credit beyond sustainable levels. Moreover, this suggests a link between
business cycles and financial cycles.
Irving Fisher, renowned for this analysis of the the debt-deflation relationship that
resulted in the Great Depression, goes further in outlining the process from boom to depression.
“In the great booms and depressions, each of the above-named factors has a played a subordinate
role as compared with two dominant factors, namely over-indebtedness to start with and
deflation start soon after… In short the big bad actors are debt-disturbances and price-level
disturbances.” (Fisher 1933, 341) Moreover, this “double trigger” of over-indebtedness and
deflation, refers to when credit is extended to such a degree that it then becomes nearly
impossible to pay off, during a deflationary period, as the debt increases in real terms.
Fisher outlines the following sequence of events which further describes this process:
“Assuming a state of over-indebtedness exists, this will tend to lead to liquidation,
through the alarm either of debtors or creditors or both. Then we may deduce the
following chain of consequences in nine links: (1) Debt liquidation leads to distress
setting and to (2) Contraction of deposit currency, as bank loans are paid off, and to a
slowing down of velocity of circulation. This contraction of deposits and of their
velocity, precipitated by distress selling, causes (3) A fall in the level of prices, in other
words, a swelling of the dollar. Assuming, as above stated, that this fall of prices is not
interfered with by reflation or otherwise, there must be (4) A still greater fall in the net
worths of business, precipitating bankruptcies and (5) A like fall in profits, which in a "
capitalistic," that is, a private-profit society, leads the concerns which are running at a
loss to make (6) A reduction in output, in trade and in employment of labor. These losses,
bankruptcies, and unemployment, lead to (7) Pessimism and loss of confidence, which in
turn lead to (8) Hoarding and slowing down still more the velocity of circulation.
The above eight changes cause (9) Complicated disturbances in the rates of interest, in
particular, a fall in the nominal, or money, rates and a rise in the real, or commodity, rates
of interest.” (Fisher 1933, 344)
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This sequence of events gives an interesting perspective on the relationship between the financial
cycle and the real economy as downward financial swings are perpetuated throughout the real
economy, reducing output, trade, employment and breading pessimism and loss of confidence.
Building on Irving’s analysis, economist Hyman Minsky outlined the Minsky Financial
Instability Hypothesis. This theory asserts that because of capitalistic incentives, sustained
expansion alone will be endogenously converted into a boom. In other words, the inherent nature
of the financial system “will ultimately lead to expansion even in the absence of a shock…short
and eventually long term interest rates can be expected to rise and the discounted present value
of future profits flows will be reduced. Speculative and Ponzi units will have to sell assets to
meet their payment commitments.” (Mullineux 1990, 76) The Minsky Hypothesis therefore
states that there is no need for an external positive shock to incite the onset of a credit boom nor
an adverse shock for “bad” outcomes to be induced. The system of financial crises is therefore
entirely endogenous.6 Minsky’s hypothesis has gained much attention since the Great Recession
and become influential to recent policy concerning the detection of systemic risk.
Financial Crises as a Market Failure
Financial crises can be more generally described as a market failure resulting from a
moral hazard problem. In the case of financial markets, there is an incentive for financial
institutions to underprice risk because, absent regulation, they are not solely burdened by the
costs associated with the results of wider systemic risk. In other words, should systemic risk
result in crises, the public at large shares the burden of the market failure and the costs are

6

See Appendix Figure 1.5 Financial and Business Cycles in the United States published by the Bank of International
Settlements which shows deviation of financial cycles from business cycles, particularly in their amplitude and
duration.
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therefore not internalized by the individual firm. For example, a staff report by the Federal
Reserve entitled “Financial Stability Monitoring” explained the instance of a firm’s choice to
increase leverage.
“When deciding whether to increase leverage, a financial institution might weigh the
firm’s higher expected bankruptcy costs (the private marginal cost) against the tax and
cost advantages of funding more with debt finance (the private marginal benefit).
However, the public marginal cost of the additional leverage exceeds the private marginal
cost as it includes also any associated increases in expected bankruptcy costs at other
institutions that might be caused by say the increased risk of either fire sales or other
forms of contagion.” (Adrian, Covitz, and Liang 2013)
Further incentivizing firms is also limited downside risk due to government safety nets
for large financial institutions. Firms considered “too big to fail”, have implicit government
backing because of their particularly wide-spread influence, driven by their size, interconnectedness, and ability to spark panic. Moreover, as financial institutions have limited liability, their
“default put option” is extremely valuable. Overall, for large financial institutions “it is rational
for them to take on riskier behavior because they will be able to capture the profits while
socializing the losses among taxpayers.” (Sitaraman 2014) This results in a system that breeds
risky behavior and discounts costs associated with risks of participating in the market, such as
losses, failure and acquisition.
Macroprudential Policy as a Solution
In cases of moral hazard, regulation seems like an intuitive response to internalize the
costs of risk. However, there must be means of appropriately monitoring systemic risk to inform
regulation. Macroprudential policy encompasses a set of tools to promote financial stability
through regulation concerning reporting, incentives and capital requirements, among others.
Moreover, it aims to address the two dimensions of financial instability. The first is the
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dimension of time. As the financial system is pro-cyclical, capital ratios approaching a financial
crisis are below what is possible to remain solvent. Then, during the crisis, regulations increase
and loan-to value ratios plummet even further restricting access to credit, exacerbating the
downturn of the crisis. Therefore, one prong of macroprudential instruments is aimed to address
the pro-cyclical nature of the financial market to prepare banks during good times to withstand
the bad. The second dimension is that of interconnectedness. This dimension refers to the
exposures that occur due to balance sheet inter-linkages and associated behavioral responses
across financial institutions. In this regard, macroprudential policy works to minimize the
amplified effects of shocks due to spillovers across institutions.
Macroprudential policy is not a new concept and has been implemented by numerous
nations to varying degrees.7 However, it’s renewed attention is most evident by the formation of
the Basel Accords II and III by the Bank of International Settlements. The accords focus on the
three main areas of capital requirements, supervisory review and market discipline.8 Moreover,
the accords also include a dimension of international coordination given the role that integrated
capital markets play in spillover effects to institutions outside of one’s own country.
CURRENT MEANS OF DETECTION
With an understanding of the theory and motivations of endogenous financial cycles,
models have been created to detect symptoms indicative of periods of high systemic risk and

7

!Policy examples with a focus on aggregate credit dynamics include Spain’s dynamic provisioning, loan eligibility
requirements of Hong Kong & the multi-pronged approach of the Croatian Central Bank
8
!Instruments in macroprudential toolkit include: 1. risk measurement methodologies; 2. financial reporting
accounting standards; 3. regulatory capital requirements; 4. funding liquidity standards; 5. collateral arrangements;
6. risk concentration limits;7. restrictions on permissible activities;8. compensation schemes;9. insurance
mechanisms;10. and managing failure and resolution.!
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which may even point to specific areas of market vulnerability. In recent years, there have been
many contributions to this literature, however, this paper will review only a few noteworthy
qualitative frameworks and quantitative models which were particularly influential in guiding the
exploration of the Global Financial Development Database.
Qualitative Frameworks
Mansharmani on the Five Lenses
Vikram Mansharmani’s book, “Boombustology”, advocates a holistic framework through
which to predict financial crises. As a “generalist” he assesses the following areas: reflexive
dynamics, excessive leverage, overconfidence, policy distortions and herd-like behavior. He then
applies these lenses to five great busts: Tulipmania, the Great Depression, the Japanese Boom
and Bust, the Asian Financial Crisis and the latest U.S. Housing boom and bust. The first area,
reflexive dynamics, refers to the tendency of higher prices to stimulate additional demand during
booms and lower prices to dissuade demand during busts. The second, relating to the “doubletrigger”, refers to the presence of financial innovation (that results when demand for securities on
behalf of investors incentivizes the creation of new forms of securities by intermediaries) as well
as signs of “cheap” money and moral hazard. The third, overconfidence, is shown through
conspicuous spending, such as trophy purchases, art auction prices and creation of skyscrapers,9
as well as new age thinking pertaining to technology, war and economic status, among others.
The fourth is the presence of policies distorting the price-discovery process. And lastly, herd-like
behavior parallels the biological phenomena of epidemics and emergence.10

9

Skyscraper Index was coined by property analyst Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein in January 1999, who noted that
the world's tallest buildings have risen on the eve of economic downturns because of their speculative nature
10
See Appendix Figure 2.1 Boombustology Lenses and Associated Indicators !
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This framework offers a very broad view through which to detect policy that spans the
market, policy and societal trends. While comprehensive and insightful, the framework does not
easily lend itself to firm quantitative indicators or thresholds which regulators could be held
accountable for detecting. However, the area of reflective dynamics concerning above trend
pricing may be a very helpful quantitative indicator by which to assess vulnerabilities in asset
markets.
The Federal Reserve on Cyclical Vulnerabilities
The Federal Reserve staff report “Financial Stability Monitoring” provides an extensive
framework through which to monitor system risk. This framework focuses on the detection of
market vulnerabilities as opposed to shocks.
“For example, the popping of an asset price bubble (i.e. the sharp reversal of inflated
asset valuations) would constitute a shock to the financial system. The popping of a
bubble is an event that is difficult to predict, yet it can trigger a chain reaction that would
ultimately impact the financial system’s capacity to intermediate. The possibility of an
asset price bubble therefore constitutes a vulnerability: it implies that asset prices could
correct sharply downward in reaction to an adverse shock. (Adrian, Covitz, and Liang
2013)
More specifically, the framework suggests the detection of vulnerabilities in the following areas:
asset markets, banks, shadow banking, and nonfinancial sector. The vulnerabilities take the form
of leverage, maturity transformation without government insurance, compressed pricing of risk,
interconnectedness, and complexity. Unlike the previous framework, the Federal Reserve’s
framework does lend itself to specific quantitative metrics. This framework was foundational to
the Federal Reserve’s heat map to detect system-wide vulnerabilities (further discussed in
quantitative models). However, the authors concede that such measures must be complemented
by a broader knowledge of the financial system.

!
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Quantitative Models
Bank of International Settlements (BIS) on the Credit-to-GDP Gap
The BIS advocates that the credit-to-GDP gap be used as the indicator to guide policy to
avoid financial crises, particularly policy concerning countercyclical capital buffers. This gap
constitutes the difference between rates of credit growth and GDP growth. This measure,
therefore, compares growth in the real economy to growth in credit to show when there are
significant deviations from the business cycle and the financial sector. This indicator exemplifies
the aspect of over-indebtedness that tends to precede financial crises.
The BIS quarterly review, published March 2014, states that the credit gap “is the EWI
(early warning indicator) of banking crises, having the best overall statistical performance among
single indicators…It also satisfies the three policy requirements (pertaining to adequate timing,
stability and interpretability), and its calculation requires data (credit and GDP) which are
generally available in most jurisdictions. These characteristics are essential considering that the
BCBS guidance underpins a globally harmonized framework.” (Drehmann, Tsatsaronis 2014
,59) Moreover, the study reaches these findings by analyzing the data of 26 countries from 1980
to 2012. The study compares the performance of the credit gap to 5 other indicators: credit
growth, GDP growth, residential property price growth, the debt service ratio (DSR) and the
non-core liability ratio. Furthermore, the study used the area under the receiver operating
characteristics curve (AUC) as a statistical tool to make these comparisons. This tool essentially
summarizes the trade off between correct and false signals. The results indicate that the credit
gap is significantly more accurate than other proposed indicators.11

11

See Appendix Figure 2.2 Bank of International Settlements’ Comparison of Early Warning Indicators
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The study does concede that “combinations of indicators could also act as benchmarks.
Indeed, research points to composite indicators that statistically outperform the credit-to-GDP
gap (such as asset price gaps and debt service ratios) .” (Drehmann, Tsatsaronis 2014, 62)
Moreover, while the credit-to-GDP may be a robust indicator, it certainly does not encapsulate
all vulnerabilities in the four markets (assets, banks, shadow banking, non financial sector).
Several financial and supervisory institutions have created more comprehensive models building
on the credit-to-GDP gap to increase their strength.
Bank of England on Credit-to-GDP Gap and Complementary Indicators
The Bank of England introduced a framework in 2014 on the basis of 18 core indicators,
including the credit gap, to evaluate aggregate vulnerabilities and making decisions regarding
capital buffers. These additional indicators relate primarily to conditions in the residential and
commercial property markets and sometimes include bank liabilities. Similar to the BIS, the
Bank of England employed the AUC technique to compare 36 possible indicators using data only
pertaining to England.12 The study concluded the following:
“The credit gap indicators tend to perform reasonably well, with high and statistically
significant AUROCs. The signal ratios at the noise-minimising threshold are all
statistically significant and comfortably above zero, while the noise ratios at the signalmaximizing threshold are reasonably low and statistically significant. The precise sectors
covered do not make a lot of difference in this sample. Nor does the choice between
broad and narrow credit. This is not surprising, as they are highly correlated. The flowbased credit measures tend to perform less well than the gap metrics, with real growth
rates of credit outperforming nominal growth rates, though not by much.”
The study goes on to suggest that indicators could then be combined into a logit
regression or heat map to more precisely guide policy.

12

See Appendix Figure 2.3 Central Bank of England’s Comparison of Early Warning Indicators
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Federal Reserve Heat Map
Utilizing the framework offered by the Federal Reserve Staff Report “Financial System
Monitoring,” a heat map was created in August 2015 to detect financial system vulnerabilities.
The heat map utilizes 44 indicators ranging across three broad categories: valuation pressures
and risk appetite, nonfinancial imbalances and financial sector imbalances. The first category
encompasses indicators in the housing, commercial real estate and equity markets. The second
assesses indicators concerning volume, quality and repayment burden of debt. The last category
includes indicators pertaining to bank and non-bank leverage, maturity transformation, shortterm funding, and other indicators of size and concentration within the financial sector. Overall,
the heat map is a very comprehensive model that meets all three standards of the BIS as it is
timely, stable and simple to interpret. Although the indicators were very influential in guiding the
exploration of data that follows, many of those in the heat map have not been collected beyond
recent history for many nations.

EXPLORING GLOBAL FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT DATA
Objective
The objective of this exploration is to utilize the data afforded by the Global Financial
Development Database to create classification models which forecast crises among and across
advanced economies. Models are to meet the three standards set by the BIS:
1.! Timing: Early warning indicators must provide signals early enough for policy measures
to take effect. For this reason, the dependent variable was the presence of a banking crisis
two years into the future. In order to derive more significant results, two models were
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created to detect crises across countries, the first predicting two years in advance and the
second predicting one year in advance.
2.! Stability: The indicator should be robust and stable to be conducive to decisive policy
action. For all models, confusion matrix measures are given to compare sensitivity,
specificity, false positive rates and accuracy.
3.! Interpretability: Forecasts and signals that policymakers find complicated to understand
are not conducive to policy action. For this reason, classification models were chosen as
they provide decision trees that are easy to follow and present clear thresholds to forecast
crises.
Scope
Data Set & Indicators
The Global Financial Development Database is the World Bank’s extensive dataset of
financial system characteristics for 203 economies. The database includes measures pertaining to
the following categories: size of financial institutions and markets (financial depth), degree to
which individuals can and do use financial services (access), efficiency of financial
intermediaries and markets in intermediating resources and facilitating financial transactions
(efficiency), and stability of financial institutions and markets (stability).
Although there were 84 indicators in the data, very few were collected beyond recent
history. Many data points of acute interest were only collected starting the late 1990s.13 In an

13

Data relating more directly to deteriorating underwriting standard, such as loan to value ratios, and the
competiveness of the financial sector, indicting the presence of “too big to fail institutions and therefore a high level
of interconnectedness, have only been collected in more recent history. This is a reflection of a high period of
deregulations in the 1980s and a greater understanding of systemic risk thereafter.
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attempt to avoid overfitting the model to the most recent global crisis, only indicators collected
since the 1980s were utilized, leaving 26 variables to test in the data set.14
Countries for Comparison
For this paper, only data pertaining to advanced economies will be reviewed. More
specifically, these are countries with a GDP per capita above $35,708.843961605. This indicator
was chosen as it is considered a standard measure of economic development. The specific
amount was chosen because the World Bank considers this threshold to define “high income”
countries. This allowed for 20 countries for comparison in the final dataset.15 Advanced
economies were of interest for two reasons:
1.! These countries have the most complete data sets for the chosen time period.
2.! Advanced economies are likely to have similarities in financial depth and in their use of
complex financial instruments.16
Banking Crisis
The dependent variable afforded by the data is the presence of a systemic banking crisis
indicated by the binary 0, for no crisis, or 1 for crisis. Crisis has been defined by the World Bank
as follows:
“A banking crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are met: a. Significant signs of
financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in
the banking system, and/or bank liquidations), b. Significant banking policy intervention
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system. The first year that both
criteria are met is considered as the year when the crisis start becoming systemic. The
end of a crisis is defined the year before both real GDP growth and real credit growth are
positive for at least two consecutive years.”
14

See Appendix Figure 3.1 GFDD Indicator Descriptions for the descriptions of the indicators used from the
database and Appendix Figure 3.2 All Independent Variables Tested for all independent variables tested which
includes modifications of these indicators and the presence of a banking crises in t-1 and 1-2 periods
15
See Appendix 3.3: High Income Countries List
16
The IMF study “Policies for macrofinancial stability: How to deal with credit boom” provides evidence that
countries of different stages of economic development vary significantly in their number and tolerance of credit
booms
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Methodology
The following is the sequence of steps taken to explore the data:
1.! Determine advanced economies through GDP per capita threshold.
2.! Determine indicators of relevance based on literature review and availability in the
desired time period of study.
3.! Create variations of indicators (as explained in Data Set & Indicators).
4.! Create classification tree models, using cross validation to avoid overfitting, for
individual countries and across countries to forecast crises in advance.
5.! Analyze results to determine which variables were significant.
Limitations
The provided data was extremely limited. More precise and robust models will require
variables that assess vulnerabilities across the four markets of interest, namely, assets, banking,
shadow banking, and the nonfinancial sector. The issue of data size also limited the ability to use
cross validation techniques to avoid overfitting. For this reason, this paper views the models
created as an exploration of significant predictors that may be significant when creating more
complex models in the future with wider datasets. The models are also limited as their
implications pertain to specifically high income countries and will have limited applications for
low and middle income countries.

!
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Results
The classification trees created per country were highly accurate. The ranges for the
confusion matrix measures (below) indicate that ability to predict positive and negative outcomes
was high and compromised very little by false positive rates, below 0.8.17

Figure 1.1 Ranges of Confusion Matrix Measures for Country Classification Trees
Sensitivity

Specificity

False Positive Rates

Accuracy

(0.92, 1)

(0.8333, 1)

(0, 0.08)

(0.9333, 1)

The individual classification trees indicate that “Domestic credit to private sector (% of
GDP” was the most common predicator variable across models, followed by “GDP (Current
USD)”. Other significant indicators included “Bank deposits to GDP (%)”, “Bank credit to bank
deposits (%)”, “Liquid liabilities in millions USD (2000 constant)” and “Central bank assets to
GDP.”
Figure 1.2 Results of Country Classification Trees by Predictor Variable
Predictor Variable
GDP (Current USD)

Category
Economic
Policy &
Debt

Frequency
4

Bank deposits to GDP (%)

Other

2

Domestic credit to private sector (%
of GDP)

Depth

5

Bank credit to bank deposits (%)

Stability

2

Countries
Austria
Belgium
Luxembourg
Netherlands
Denmark
Norway
Finland
Japan
Sweden
United Kingdom
United States
Germany

17

See Appendix Figures 3.4 Detailed Country Classification Tree Outcomes and Figures 3.5-3.19 for the
Classification Trees for each country
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Liquid liabilities in millions USD
(2000 constant)
Central bank assets to GDP (%)18

Depth

1

Ireland
Iceland

Depth

1

Switzerland

The variables range across categories although the most common is that of Financial
Depth, unsurprisingly, as above trend financial expansion points towards over-indebtedness.
However, GDP growth would suggest a change, not only in the financial sector, but also the real
economy showing that the connection between real growth and financial sector cycles is not to
be understated. Also of interest in the results was the present of Central Bank Assets to GDP in
predicting financial crises in Switzerland. This indicates that traditional monetary policy may
still be influential to the onset and deterrence of financial crises in addition to macroprudential
policy.
In an attempt to assess significant indicators across countries with comparable financial
depth, and of similar financial sector complexity, a classification tree was created to find
significant indicators across advanced economies. This classification model scored significantly
worse in specificity, at only 0.10, however the overall accuracy of the model was 0.8967 and
there was a false positive rate of 0. 19

18
19

This was the only indicator in which going below the threshold pointed towards crisis
See Appendix 3.20 Confusion Matrix Measures 2 Year (left) v. 1 Year Forecast (Right)
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Figure 1.3 Classification Tree Across Advanced Economies to Forecast 2 Years Ahead
Bank-Lending Deposit Spread

Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)

Mutual Fund Assets to GDP (%)

Private credit by deposit money
banks to GDP (%)

To explore whether the specificity rate could be improved, a classification tree was
created to forecast crises only one year in advance. The specificity rate improved to 0.26,
however, this did compromise the false positive rate slightly, increasing from 0 to 0.0036832.

!

20

Figure 1.4 Classification Tree Across Advanced Economies to Forecast 1 Year Ahead
Bank-Lending Deposit Spread

Banking Crisis T-1

Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)

Bank credit to bank deposits (%)

Bank Deposits to GDP
Bank credit to bank
deposits (%)

Life insurance premium volume
to GDP (%)
Domestic credit to private sector (% of
GDP)

INSIGHTS & CONCLUSION
Key takeaways
The exploration of the dataset made it clear that data on financial depth and stability in
has been lacking. Furthermore, while there has been a dramatic uptake in data collection post
2008,20 this provides a limited foundation by which to create models that can accurately detect
systemic risk at the macro level. Of particular interest for future studies will be indicators

20

See Appendix Figure 4.1 Financial Soundness Indicators: Reporting Countries and Economies on
The International Monetary Fund’s data collection trends!
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concerning capital-to-risk weighted assets, loan-to-value ratios, the Lerner index, and others,
which point directly towards the deterioration of underwriting standards and structural
vulnerabilities in the financial sector.
While there was significant overlap in the indicators that appeared in the literature review
and those that proved significant in the models, the degree of significance of the bank lendingdeposit spread was unexpected, as terms and conditions of rates vary across countries. However,
perhaps across high income countries, with similar practices, the bank lending-deposit spread
may be a more significant indicator to be incorporated in future models. Moreover, as
macroprudential policy also incorporates elements of international coordination, the use of the
bank lending-deposit spread as a cross-country indicator, may be helpful in macroprudential
policy implementation.
Both in models for individual countries and across countries, false positive rates were
extremely low. Furthermore, increasing the complexity of models only slightly compromised
false positive rates. This may indicate that the fear of over-pricing risk is not as significant a
trade-off to preventing crises. Overall, these models support that early warning indicators may be
useful to guiding macroprudential policy, without significantly compromising growth.

Concluding Remarks
While large institutions with an interest in global economy, such as prominent
universities and the Bretton Woods Institutions, have conducted significant studies in the arena
of financial cycles and systemic risk, data of macro-aggregates is still in need of further analysis.
More specifically, the results of this study indicate that significant indicators may be correlated
within regions, not only among nations of comparable economic development, and therefore
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models at the regional level should also be tested. Furthermore, the use of “random forests” as a
statistical method could be used to combine the results of the individual country decision trees to
draw further insights, as opposed to combining the data across countries, in an effort to avoid
overfitting models to the very limited data available. Additionally, the strength of the indicators
in this study indicate that macroprudential policy, on the whole, may be a practical solution with
limited tradeoffs. However, further research is needed on the costs of macroprudential policy in
correcting specific areas of market vulnerabilities, as these may vary.
Even with significant gains in this area of research, institutional memory has begun to
fade. The United States financial cycle has moved into a full upswing once more. Loans to
private sector reached an all time high of 2023.14 USD Billion in March of 201621 and the
biggest banks are 37 percent larger than they were before crisis. It is clear that robust and precise
models are still needed to facilitate decisive, forward-looking, policy.

21

See Appendix Figure 4.2 U.S. Commercial and Industrial Loans (2006-2016)
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APPENDIX
Figure 1.1 U.S. Federal Funds Rate Over Time (2006-2015)

Figure 1.2 U.S. Unemployment Rate Over Time (2007-2015)

!

25

Figure 1.3 U.S. Annual Growth Rate of Real GDP (1990-2014)

Figure 1.4 Financial Sector Vulnerability to Shocks and Pricing of Risk
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Figure 1.5 U.S. Financial and Business Cycles Over Time (1970-2011)
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Figure 2.1 Boombustology Lenses and Associated Indicators
Lense
Reflexive Dynamics

Indicators
•! Credit Criteria
•! Collateral Credit
•! Hot Money

Leverage/ Deflation

•! Financial Innovation
•! Cheap/Excessive Money
•! Moral Hazard

Overconfidence

•! Conspicous Consumption
•! New-Era Thinking

Policy Distortion

•! Supply/Demand Manipulation
•! Regulatory Shift

Consensus/Herd

•! Amateur investors
•! Silent Leadership
•! Popular Media

Figure 2.2 Bank of International Settlements’ Comparison of Early Warning Indicators
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Figure 2.4 Central Bank of England’s Comparison of Early Warning Indicators

!
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Figure 3.1 GFDD Indicator Descriptions
!

Indicator Name

Indicator
Code

Central bank assets
to GDP (%)
GFDD.DI.06

Depth

Deposit money
bank assets to
deposit money
bank assets and
central bank assets
(%)

GFDD.DI.04

Depth

GFDD.DI.02

Depth

Definition Short (As provided by World Bank)
Ratio of central bank assets to GDP. Central bank assets are
claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central
Bank.
1961-2013
Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of sum of
deposit money bank and Central Bank claims on domestic
nonfinancial real sector. Assets include claims on domestic real
nonfinancial sector which includes central, state and local
governments, nonfinancial public enterprises and private
sector. Deposit money banks comprise commercial banks and
other financial institutions that accept transferable deposits,
such as demand deposits.
1960-2013
Total assets held by deposit money banks as a share of GDP.
Assets include claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector
which includes central, state and local governments,
nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector. Deposit
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand
deposits.
1961-2013

GFDD.DI.14

Depth

Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources
provided to the private sector.

1960-2013

GFDD.DI.08

Depth

Demand, time and saving deposits in deposit money banks and
other financial institutions as a share of GDP.

1961-2013

GFDD.DI.11

Depth

Ratio of assets of insurance companies to GDP.

1980-2013

Deposit money
banks' assets to
GDP (%)
Domestic credit to
private sector (%
of GDP)
Financial system
deposits to GDP
(%)
Insurance
company assets to
GDP (%)

Type

Time
Period
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Life insurance
premium volume
to GDP (%)

GFDD.DI.09

Depth

Liquid liabilities to
GDP (%)

GFDD.DI.05

Depth

Mutual fund assets
to GDP (%)

GFDD.DI.07

Depth

GFDD.DI.03

Depth

GFDD.DI.13

Depth

Ratio of life insurance premium volume to GDP. Premium
volume is the insurer's direct premiums earned (if
Property/Casualty) or received (if Life/Health) during the
previous calendar year.
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. Liquid liabilities are also
known as broad money, or M3. They are the sum of currency
and deposits in the central bank (M0), plus transferable
deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus time and savings
deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits, certificates of
deposit, and securities repurchase agreements (M2), plus
travelers checks, foreign currency time deposits, commercial
paper, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by
residents.
Ratio of assets of mutual funds to GDP. A mutual fund is a
type of managed collective investment scheme that pools
money from many investors to purchase securities.
Total assets held by financial institutions that do not accept
transferable deposits but that perform financial intermediation
by accepting other types of deposits or by issuing securities or
other liabilities that are close substitutes for deposits as a share
of GDP. It covers institutions such as saving and mortgage loan
institutions, post-office savings institution, building and loan
associations, finance companies that accept deposits or deposit
substitutes, development banks, and offshore banking
institutions. Assets include claims on domestic real
nonfinancial sector such as central-, state- and local
government, nonfinancial public enterprises and private sector.
Ratio of assets of pension funds to GDP. A pension fund is any
plan, fund, or scheme that provides retirement income.

GFDD.DI.12

Depth

Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to GDP.

Nonbank financial
institutions’ assets
to GDP (%)
Pension fund
assets to GDP (%)
Private credit by
deposit money
banks and other
financial
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1990-2013

1961-2013
1980-2013

1961-2013
1990-2013

1961-2013

institutions to GDP
(%)
Private credit by
deposit money
banks to GDP (%)

GFDD.DI.01

GDP (Current
USD)

NY.GDP.MK
TP.CD

Depth
Economic
Policy &
Debt:
indicators

GFDD.EI.02

Efficiency

GFDD.EI.08

Efficiency

GFDD.OI.02

Other

Bank lendingdeposit spread
Credit to
government and
state owned
enterprises to GDP
(%)

Bank deposits to
GDP (%)
Banking crisis
dummy
(1=banking crisis,
0=none)
Liquid liabilities in
millions USD
(2000 constant)

!

GFDD.OI.19

Other

GFDD.OI.07

Other

The financial resources provided to the private sector by
domestic money banks as a share of GDP. Domestic money
banks comprise commercial banks and other financial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand
deposits.

National accounts: US$ at current prices: Aggregate
Difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Lending rate
is the rate charged by banks on loans to the private sector and
deposit interest rate is the rate offered by commercial banks on
three-month deposits.

Ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the
government and state-owned enterprises and GDP.
The total value of demand, time and saving deposits at
domestic deposit money banks as a share of GDP. Deposit
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand
deposits.
Dummy variable for the presence of banking crisis (1=banking
crisis, 0=none)
Absolute value of liquid liabilities in 2000 US million dollars.
Liquid liabilities are also known as broad money, or M3. They
are the sum of currency and deposits in the central bank (M0),
plus transferable deposits and electronic currency (M1), plus
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1961-2013

Annual

1980-2013

1980-2013

1961-2013

1970-2011

1960-2013

Remittance
inflows to GDP
(%)
Stock market
return (%, year-onyear)
Consumer price
index (2010=100,
average)
Consumer price
index (2010=100,
December)

Bank credit to
bank deposits (%)
Stock price
volatility

GFDD.OI.13

Other

time and savings deposits, foreign currency transferable
deposits, certificates of deposit, and securities repurchase
agreements (M2), plus travelers checks, foreign currency time
deposits, commercial paper, and shares of mutual funds or
market funds held by residents.
Workers' remittances and compensation of employees
comprise current transfers by migrant workers and wages and
salaries earned by nonresident workers. Data are the sum of
three items defined in the fifth edition of the IMF's Balance of
Payments Manual: workers' remittances, compensation of
employees, and migrants' transfers.

GFDD.OM.02

Other

Stock market return is the growth rate of annual average stock
market index.

1961-2013

GFDD.OE.02

Other
Economic

Average Consumer Price Index (2010=100)

1960-2013

GFDD.OE.01

Other
Economic

1960-2013

GFDD.SI.04

Stability

GFDD.SM.01

Stability

December Consumer Price Index (2010=100)
The financial resources provided to the private sector by
domestic money banks as a share of total deposits. Domestic
money banks comprise commercial banks and other financial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand
deposits. Total deposits include demand, time and saving
deposits in deposit money banks.
Stock price volatility is the average of the 360-day volatility of
the national stock market index.

!
!
!
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1970-2013

1960-2013
1960-2013

Figure 3.2: All Independent Variables Tested
X1
X2
X3
X4
X5
X6
X7
X8
X9
X10
X11
X12
X13
X14
X15
X16
X17
X18
X19
X20
X21
X22
X23
X24
X25
X26

'Bank credit to bank deposits (%)',!
'Bank deposits to GDP (%)',!
'Bank lending-deposit spread',!
'Central bank assets to GDP (%)',!
'Credit to government and state owned enterprises to GDP (%)',!
'Deposit money bank assets to deposit money bank assets and central
bank assets (%)',!
'Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%)',!
'Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP)',!
'Financial system deposits to GDP (%)', !
'GDP (Current USD)',!
'Insurance company assets to GDP (%)',!
'Life insurance premium volume to GDP (%)',!
'Liquid liabilities in millions USD (2000 constant)',!
'Liquid liabilities to GDP (%)', !
'Mutual fund assets to GDP (%)',!
'Nonbank financial institutions’ assets to GDP (%)',!
'Pension fund assets to GDP (%)',!
'Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions
to GDP (%)',!
'Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (%)',!
'Remittance inflows to GDP (%)',!
'Stock market return (%, year-on-year)',!
'Stock price volatility',!
'Banking crisis -1', !
'Banking crisis -2', !
'Log GDP',!
'Log Liquid Liabilities'!
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Figure 3.3: High Income Country List
1.! 'Australia',
2.! 'Austria',
3.! 'Belgium',
4.! 'Canada',
5.! 'Denmark',
6.! 'Finland',
7.! 'Germany',
8.! 'Iceland',
9.! 'Ireland',
10.!'Japan',
11.!'Luxembourg',
12.!'Macao SAR, China',
13.!'Netherlands',
14.!'Norway',
15.!'Qatar',
16.!'Singapore',
17.!'Sweden',
18.!'Switzerland',
19.!'United Kingdom',
20.!'United States'
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Figure 3.4 Detailed Country Classification Tree Outcomes

Country

Predictor
Variable
Austria
GDP (Current
USD)
Belgium
GDP (Current
USD)
Denmark
Bank deposits to
GDP (%)
Finland
Domestic credit
to private sector
(% of GDP)
Germany
Bank credit to
bank deposits (%)
Iceland
Liquid liabilities
in millions USD
(2000 constant)
Ireland
Bank credit to
bank deposits (%)
Japan
Domestic credit
to private sector
(% of GDP)
Luxembourg GDP (Current
USD)
Netherlands GDP (Current
USD)
Norway
Bank deposits to
GDP (%)
Sweden
Domestic credit
to private sector
(% of GDP)
Switzerland Central bank
assets to GDP
(%)*
United
'Domestic credit
Kingdom
to private sector
(% of GDP)',
United
'Domestic credit
States
to private sector
(% of GDP)',
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Node Point

Sensitivity Specificity
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0

1

6.95867e+11 1

1

0

1
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1

.0741
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1
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1
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0
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1

1

0

1
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1
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0
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Figure 3.5 Austria Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.6 Belgium Classification Tree Results

!

37

Figure 3.7 Denmark Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.8 Finland Classification Tree Results
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Figure 3.9 Germany Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.10 Iceland Classification Tree Results
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Figure 3.11 Ireland Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.12 Japan Classification Tree Results
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Figure 3.13 Luxembourg Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.14 Netherlands Classification Tree Results
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Figure 3.15 Norway Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.16 Sweden Classification Tree Results
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Figure 3.17 Switzerland Classification Tree Results

Figure 3.18 United Kingdom Classification Tree Results
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Figure 3.19 United States Classification Tree Results
!
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Figure 3.20 Confusion Matrix Measures 2 Year (left) v. 1 Year Forecast (Right)

Confusion Matrix
Sensitivity:
1
Specificity:
0.10
False Positive:
0
Accuracy Rate:
0.8967

!

Confusion Matrix
Sensitivity:
0.9963
Specificity:
0.2632
False Positive:
0.0036832
Accuracy Rate:
0.9267
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Figure 4.1 Financial Soundness Indicators: Reporting Countries and Economies

Figure 4.2 U.S. Commercial and Industrial Loans (2006-2016)
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